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There were two branches to the Leave campaign in the 2016 referendum, each led by an ebullient 
politician. Both men – Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage – overspill with self-confidence; each conveys 
a spirit of bonhomie that embodies his privileged background more than disguising it. Yet the image 
of the typical Leave voter is quite different. Since the referendum a huge amount of attention has been 
focused on so-called ‘left behind’ people and places. The UK’s collective choice to leave the European 
Union often appears as ‘the revenge of the places that don’t matter’. Although low-income voters formed 
a key element of the pro-Leave referendum majority, even if few are as affluent at Johnson or Farage, 
many pro-Brexit voters are at least comfortably off. Excellent social science research has interrogated 
‘the left behind’ and ‘globalisation’s losers’. Arguably, though, their comfortable counterparts have been 
neglected, allowing misleading mythology about the social bases of support for Brexit to grow up. 
This report seeks to counterbalance that conventional story. It considers the attitudes and aspirations 
of these Comfortable Leavers. Commissioned by the UK in a Changing Europe, NatCen conducted 8 
deliberative workshops – six in different parts of England and one each in Scotland and Wales. Not, 
in itself a representative study, deliberative research of this kind adds richness and texture to our 
understanding of politics and society. Equally, this qualitative project was designed against the backdrop 
of earlier NatCen survey-based research, which had identified a key group of ‘affluent Eurosceptics’. 
The workshops provoked rich and wide-ranging discussions, among people who generally enjoy a 
good quality of life, but worry about crime and, often, about immigration. Some are also concerned that 
‘British people’ are no longer willing to take on some jobs, so key sectors might suffer if migrants stop 
coming. Typically proud of their country, many have a sense that things were better before the UK joined 
the EU – and want to get back to that world. Most anticipate more investment in public services – the 
police and military alongside the NHS and social care. The road ahead could well be bumpy, but there 
was confidence in the pluck and resilience of ordinary people. A certain sense of nostalgia came through 
– though lots of things might have to change, the aim is to get back to a more authentic collective way-
of-life. 
Debate around Brexit and UK governance too often collapses into clichés – especially by treating places 
as homogeneous – populated by a single type of person. For example, debate about the ‘Red Wall’ that 
Boris Johnson’s Conservatives demolished in 2019 falls easily into ‘left behind’- ‘it’s grim up north’- type 
narratives, replete with assumptions about Labour winning back its ‘natural’ northern constituency. 
James Kanagasooriam’s original ‘Red Wall’ was that socio-demographically and economically these 
constituencies seats look Conservative seems to have been too easily forgotten. Danny Dorling points to 
52% those who voted for Brexit living in the south of England – but many Leavers in the north also enjoy 
comfortable lifestyles. Jane Green and Raluca Pahontu have shown that wealth increased the appetite 
of voters to choose change in 2016, since it insulated them from risk. Though not all our Comfortable 
Leavers are wealthy, these workshops and this report add to our understanding of the values, attitudes 
and aspirations of better-off leave voters. Alongside this wide-ranging report from NatCen, a UK in a 
Changing Europe briefing offers a complementary short analysis of this research.
The 2019 general election provided an opportunity to fulfil a long-standing aspiration for a project of 
this kind. It was originally designed as a face-to-face project in a series of particular neighbourhoods 
(inspired by the West Kent Golf Club – the place, legend has it, that Nigel Farage got his first break 
that led to a job in the City). But the Covid pandemic intervened. Fortunately, through the project ‘How 
does post-Brexit Britain wish to exercise its Sovereignty’ on the Governance after Brexit programme, 
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NatCen had already demonstrated that they were able to deliver effective deliberative workshops on-line. 
Doing so did involve a switch from working in particular neighbourhoods to a regional focus – although 
a strong sense of place nevertheless shone through many of the workshops. I am very grateful to Ceri 
Davies who led the project and the NatCen team who delivered for their flexibility and skill in challenging 
circumstances. And to the participants, from whom I learnt a great deal.  
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Introduction 
The vote in favour of leaving the EU has been widely interpreted as a protest vote by those who are said 
to be ‘left behind’ – that is, older people with relatively few, if any, educational qualifications living in 
economically less dynamic parts of the UK (Clarke et al., 2017; Goodwin and Heath, 2016). However, this 
group represents only part of the overall Leave vote.1
Less attention has been paid to more affluent Leave voters living in areas with relatively high levels of 
wealth. This is a group that we call ‘Comfortable Leavers’. They broadly share the same characteristics 
as the ‘affluent Eurosceptics’ identified by NatCen: mainly higher income, Conservative voters with 
noticeably anti-welfare views. This group make up 23% of the population, 75% of whom voted Leave 
in the 2016 EU Referendum. Whilst previous research by the UK in a Changing Europe (UKICE) and 
others has shown that the idea of ‘left behind’ people and places has taken hold in public discourse; not 
enough work has yet been done to tease out and explain income-related differences in the Leave vote. 
This report shares the findings from a study designed to explore what matters to Comfortable Leavers 
about the UK leaving the EU, as well as their priorities for their communities, and the UK more widely. It 
provides a rounded and in-depth understanding of the views of these voters, allowing us to draw more 
reliable conclusions about the similarities and differences between different income groups and places 
across Britain.  
The findings were generated from eight deliberative workshops involving 130 people who voted both 
Leave (73) and Remain (55), as well as two people who told us they did not vote. 
This project was initially conceived before the introduction of social distancing measures by the UK 
government in response to the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020. This required us to move the 
workshops online from the in-person groups initially planned. These took place using Zoom in June and 
July 2020. 
Research Aims
The aim of this research was to explore the views and priorities of higher-income Leave voters for Britain 
after Brexit. It had the following objectives:
•  To identify what matters to this group about the UK leaving the EU, with particular reference to  
socio-cultural dimensions
•  To understand what changes this group anticipated to their communities and the UK as a whole as 
the UK left the EU 
• To learn what priorities or hopes people had for these anticipated changes
• To consider whether such views on the future were distinct to Leave voters
1 Whilst there is no simple representation of the demographics of the Leave vote, work by Swales (2016) provides an analysis of 
segments of the population who voted strongly one way or another. Of those that map to characteristics of those said to be ‘left 
behind’, those ‘economically deprived anti-immigration’ make up 12% of the population, of which 95% voted Leave. Another 
relevant group – older working class make up 16% of the population, of which 73% voted Leave.
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We wanted to explore these objectives in relation to four main subjects: 
 SOCIETY     who lives here and how do we live?
 IDENTITY     what values, ideas or beliefs shape us?
 ECONOMY & SERVICES     producing and trading goods, jobs and the labour market
 GOVERNANCE     who makes decisions on the things that shape our lives and how? 
Methodology
Our original plan was to hold in-person deliberative workshops with Comfortable Leavers in eight 
locations across the country. These were: the East of England, London and the South East, the North 
East, the South West, Scotland, Wales, the West Midlands, and Yorkshire and the Humber.
Deliberative workshops are a form of facilitated group discussion that provide participants with the 
opportunity to consider issues in depth, challenge each other’s opinions and develop their views to reach 
an informed position. This approach was selected to allow researchers to understand the underlying 
drivers that inform people’s positions and perspectives. 
In order to distinguish the views of Leave voters, we included a proportion of Remain voters in the 
workshops to understand the beliefs and priorities of each group, and how they are distinct from one 
another. 
Each workshop was designed to have up to 16 participants, with a greater proportion of Leave (10) 
to Remain (6) voters in each. Where this was not possible, a minimum 50:50 split was achieved. After 
satisfying inclusion criteria on income - participants were included if their income was above the median 
for their statistical region – quotas were used to obtain a diverse sample of ages, levels of educational 
achievement, employment situation and property ownership (see Appendix A).
Workshops were 2.5 hours long and used a mixture of plenary and small group discussions. We split the 
group into two smaller, separate discussions depending on whether someone voted Leave or Remain. 
These groups were initially scheduled to begin in April 2020. However, before the fieldwork started, social 
distancing measures were introduced. The research team decided to move delivery online using video 
conferencing software and fieldwork began in June 2020. Further detail of our approach can be found in 
Appendix B.
Format of this Report
This report is designed predominantly to report the views and perspectives of participants who voted 
Leave in the 2016 EU referendum. It is intended to show whether place is significant in shaping people’s 
views, and to investigate the degree to which Leave views might be distinct (or indeed similar) to Remain 
perspectives.
Although we deliberately avoid giving numerical values, the data included helps us to identify trends in 
the meanings and explanations behind people’s attitudes, and verbatim quotes are selected to illustrate 
salient points.
We begin this report by offering a snapshot of each workshop and then identifying the issues of 
importance across places. Chapters 3 and 4 then explore these issues in greater detail, drawing 
out people’s priorities for post-Brexit Britain, as well as the changes they anticipate that leaving the 
EU will bring. The order in which these views were discussed with respect to our four subjects of 
interest changes between chapters, reflecting their prominence in discussions. We then conclude by 
summarising the findings on what our group of ‘Comfortable Leavers’ want from Brexit.  
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What mattered to Comfortable 
Leavers about leaving the EU? 
This chapter introduces the issues Leave voters identified as most important about exiting the EU. 
Their concerns were mostly related to the UK level and were articulated in the abstract rather than 
evidenced through people’s everyday lived experiences or in ways specific to their local areas. We focus 
here on reporting the views of Leave discussion groups to give an overall sense of their points and 
considerations.
The chapter begins with a short overview of each workshop to summarise the general points covered 
in each location. Although these show some variation in emphasis across geography, we also draw out 
cross-cutting themes as they relate to the domains of society, governance, identity and the economy we 
had invited them to discuss. The final section of the chapter considers what might have influenced the 
views expressed.
Workshop Overviews 
The sections overleaf illustrate the general points covered in each location and highlight area-specific 
characteristics that people identified to the places they lived. They are presented alphabetically.
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EAST OF ENGLAND
A total of 14 people took part in the East of England workshop: seven who voted to leave the EU, 
and seven who voted to remain.
Those who voted Leave reported that they lived predominantly in an agricultural and rural 
environment, in a mix of country towns and villages. Only one participant lived in a city. Participants 
enjoyed living in their area, and commented on the beautiful countryside and woodland, which was 
particularly valuable to them during the Covid-19 lockdown. Traditional industry was part of the local 
economy, particularly grain farming. However, there were some concerns that the areas they lived 
in were part of the “commuter belt”, with people purchasing homes in their towns and villages to 
commute to London, Cambridge, Luton and Bedford.
Participants felt they lived in diverse communities, with a mix of young people, families and older 
people. The participant living in a local city reported that it was multicultural, which was seen as a 
positive change over the years. Those in villages and towns were concerned about the lack of local 
amenities, such as a good bus service, although others reported that they had access to local pubs, 
garages and schools.
Leavers in the East of England were concerned about immigration policy. They felt strongly that 
immigrants should contribute economically to the UK, with hard-working and English-speaking 
migrants welcomed. This contrasted with their anxieties about the lack of integration of non-
English speaking migrants, with migrant women seen as dependent on their husbands for support. 
There were also concerns about social segregation in cities as a result. A lack of social integration 
between UK residents and migrants was seen as a threat to British culture. The emphasis on 
welcoming those who could work was related to the worries about funding for other more deserving 
issues. Respondents contrasted funding for children in social care with benefits paid to asylum 
seekers, suggesting that a decline in immigration would lead to an increase in funding for causes 
they supported.
However, the group recognised some challenges involved in reducing the number of immigrants 
within the UK. There were questions about whether British workers would take on low-paid work, 
such as fruit picking or care work, which had often been done by European immigrants. The “bad 
attitude” of many UK workers was seen as a barrier to filling job vacancies in these sectors.
The group also touched on the importance of British identity. Participants suggested that the Church 
of England was at the heart of British identity. The decline in church attendance was associated 
with a decline in moral standards, and the emergence of a multi-religious society was seen as 
undermining British identity. Particular concerns were raised about the increase in the British Muslim 
population. 
Finally, governance issues were less important to this group than other factors, such as immigration 
policy and integration. However, they were hopeful that the UK would be able to act more nimbly 
when removed from the perceived bureaucracy of the EU. The major expected benefits from this 
included being able to control the UK’s borders and promote fairness for British workers. 
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LONDON AND THE SOUTH EAST
A total of 16 people took part in the London and South East workshop: 11 who voted to leave the 
EU, and five who voted to remain. 
Participants all lived in the London fringe – either in outer London boroughs or areas that bordered 
London. Leave-voting respondents living in London felt that their areas differed significantly from 
other parts of the South East. London was described as multicultural and multiracial. London was 
seen to have changed for the worse over time, as a result of demographic changes such as the 
elderly population dying and immigrants moving to the city. 
Among participants in the South East, a few common themes emerged. In contrast to London, 
participants identified community spirit as one of the positives about their locations, especially in 
small villages. In more affluent and rural towns, participants reported good private schools and a 
lack of traffic, both of which were welcomed. However, for others in the South East, their areas 
were described as built-up, with new developments being added on the edge of the greenbelt. 
This was especially the case for commuter towns. Participants were concerned about the lack of 
accompanying infrastructure, such as shops or medical facilities, and these concerns were also 
mentioned by those living in London. Traffic was particularly problematic.
Finally, safety was raised by participants, both in London and in the South East. Participants 
reported increasing levels of knife and gun crime in their local areas. The closure of local police 
stations was viewed negatively as a result.
Leave voters in London and the South East supported changes to the immigration system, focusing 
on skilled migrants who could help address the economic needs of the UK. There were preferences 
for migrants from certain countries, such as China, who were seen as well-established within the UK, 
while immigration from other (non-disclosed) countries was seen as threatening to British identity 
due to extremist views. Migrants were welcomed if they spoke English, adapted to British culture, 
and worked. This group was concerned that English was becoming a second language in their local 
areas due to high levels of immigration. Like other groups, Leave voters in this area expected that 
reducing the number of immigrants would lead to greater financial support for other issues, such 
as homelessness, schools and hospitals. However, the loss of current European immigrants after 
EU exit was viewed as a negative consequence of the referendum, which would have an economic 
impact on several sectors such as health and social care. 
For this group, core components of British identity included freedom of speech, friendliness, and a 
respect for British law. Referencing recent protests in Bristol that led to the removal of a statue, the 
group felt that monuments should be protected as part of freedom of speech, along with respect 
for the Union Jack. There were concerns that Britain had become “too soft” on criminals and that 
sentencing was too lenient. While there was agreement that a multicultural society was enriching for 
citizens, they thought British culture should be prioritised and adopted by migrants. People living 
in the UK should have a shared pride in the UK’s national identity, regardless of their background or 
origin. 
The group felt that leaving the EU would lead to greater accountability in political decision-making in 
the UK, with central government required to take full responsibility for all decisions made.
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NORTH EAST
A total of 10 people took part in the North East workshop: two who voted to leave the EU, six who 
voted to remain and two who didn’t vote. A further four Leave voters living in the North East were 
interviewed after the workshop. 
Respondents who voted Leave in the North East had a strong sense of pride in their local area. 
Geographically, many respondents reported that they lived in quiet rural areas, which were short 
drives from beaches, the North Yorkshire Moors, Newcastle airport and local shopping towns. 
Participants felt this was the best of both worlds, allowing them to access the countryside and rural 
life while also remaining well-connected.
There was a strong sense of community. There were comparisons made between the North East 
and the South, with people in the South (particularly London) seen as unfriendly compared to 
their northern counterparts. People felt the North East was close-knit and that “banter” was a 
key part of their identity. However, while participants felt that it was positive that Indian and Sikh 
communities thrived in the area, they felt that they were not integrated with the local area, with little 
opportunity for communities to come together. Finally, there were negative aspects to community 
life. Participants reported high unemployment and teenage pregnancy rates in their area.
Participants who voted Leave reported concerns about crime, often on a national scale, with news 
media identified as a key factor in their fears. Participants were also concerned about the lack of 
integration within their areas, with some feeling unsafe when travelling in certain areas where many 
migrants live. There were distinctions made between immigrants who contributed positively to the 
economy and those who were viewed negatively for not working. Australia was given as an example 
of a country with positive immigration policies, including the ability to deport immigrants who had 
committed crimes. However, members of the group were concerned that European migrants would 
no longer feel welcome after the referendum, with participants emphasising that their referendum 
vote did not indicate a personal dislike for Europeans.
British identity was also a core concern for this group, seen to be based on parliamentary 
democracy, the respect for the rule of law, and a pride in helping others and welcoming refugees. 
However, for some, the British tradition of welcoming refugees, such as Jewish Europeans in the 
1930s, had been undermined by the rise in British-born terrorists from ethnic minorities. Devolution 
was also seen to undermine traditional British identity, with Northern Ireland seen as a “half-way 
house” between Ireland (and the EU) and Britain. Participants felt that the UK as a nation had 
become too “soft”, saying that political correctness and concerns with racism had gone “too far”. 
The return of British manufacturing was seen as a priority for this group. Pride in Britain’s industrial 
heritage was one reason given for prioritising this after EU exit, in addition to supporting the North 
East’s economy, which was seen to have suffered more from production being outsourced overseas. 
The redevelopment of local industry was key, with unnecessary EU regulations seen as a barrier to 
success. While the group acknowledged the need for many European workers, it was felt that a 
reduction in the number of immigrants would free up jobs for UK workers. 
Finally, it was felt that the UK had a different political outlook to other European countries, with 
Britain preferring a right-of-centre government in comparison to social democratic models in 
Europe. This difference was seen as one important reason for the UK to have greater control and 
accountability in its political systems.
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SCOTLAND
A total of 21 people took part in the Scotland workshop: 14 who voted to leave the EU, and seven 
who voted to remain.
Leave-voters in Scotland were dispersed across different areas, with participants living in cities and 
towns, including Edinburgh and Aberdeen, smaller towns, and rural villages in the Highlands. The 
geographical diversity of the group meant that there were few commonalities in location, although 
many spoke of strong community ties. Those living in the countryside reported many positives, 
including living in beautiful rural areas, with access to local landmarks such as beaches, and being 
on the tourist whisky trail. Others focused on the economies of their local areas, which included 
farming, fishing, oil and gas, and military bases. For those in cities and towns, advantages included 
good infrastructure, including good transport links, and shopping and retail opportunities. 
In comparison to Leave voters in other regions, those in Scotland did not identify immigration or 
identity as a key facet of their decision to vote to leave the EU. Several participants felt that they 
had never lost their Scottish identity, so leaving the EU would not affect how they identified. Instead, 
trade and the economy were key priorities. Participants wanted to have seamless trade with EU 
countries, although they said that, should tariffs be introduced, this could promote domestic 
production and sales. Leaving the EU was seen to ensure a greater ability to make deals with the 
rest of the world, with priority countries including the US and Canada.
The redevelopment of industry was also a priority. The loss of coal and steel industries was seen 
as significant for Scotland, with few large industrial centres now providing employment. Vocational 
training, such as in building or bricklaying, was seen as important to develop the skills of young 
people.
Politically, the group wanted the Scottish government to have more power after the UK left the 
EU. Scottish people were seen to be better served by a Scottish government, and it was important 
for the devolved nations to obtain more power in an independent UK. Participants distinguished 
between domestic and foreign policy, with domestic policy seen as managed best at Holyrood, 
while foreign policy for the UK should be managed by Westminster. This was seen as fairer for 
society. 
The group also felt that a greater role was required for the devolved nations in negotiations with 
the EU, with examples given of Nicola Sturgeon being excluded from talks. However, the group did 
not feel that there was a case for an independent Scotland re-joining the EU, with one participant 
commenting that Scotland had more power as one of four countries in the UK, compared to being 
one of 27 countries in the EU. The group prioritised a greater role for Scotland post-EU exit within 
the existing UK political structures.
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SOUTH WEST
A total of 19 people took part in the South West workshop: 11 who voted to leave the EU, and eight 
who voted to remain. 
Participants in the South West mainly lived in the countryside or in smaller towns. They described 
beautiful countryside and coastline, and characterised their areas as peaceful, picturesque and 
idyllic. Participants made reference to the historical monuments in their local area, including the city 
of Bath, and noted the importance of tourism for the local economy. 
Leave voters in the South West region supported a change to immigration. Like voters in the West 
Midlands, this group believed that too many people sought asylum in the UK and felt that many 
were falsely travelling to the UK to receive benefits. There were also concerns about a lack of 
integration of immigrants, who were seen to be creating their own “little country”. Instead, the group 
felt that immigrants should assimilate through learning English and understanding British culture and 
beliefs.
The economy was another priority for members of this group. Participants felt that current patterns 
of immigration prevented young people from accessing skilled trades, such as building or HGV 
driving, with apprenticeships being reduced. The group suggested that priority should be given to 
British people to work in the NHS, with bursaries available to nursing students. This would, they 
argued, reduce the UK’s reliance on immigration for staffing.
Governance was also a concern, with some participants in the group suggesting that the UK would 
be able to “tighten” borders after leaving the EU. This would discourage people from seeking 
asylum in the UK and reduce the number of immigrants travelling for benefits. Others felt that the 
UK should welcome many types of immigrant, including asylum seekers and economic migrants, 
but widen its offer to take in migrants from around the world. Examples were given of Hong Kong 
citizens and the offer from the UK government to create a path to UK citizenship. This was seen as 
part of the UK’s role in supporting human rights around the world. 
Finally, there was support for more decision-making at the local or regional level. The multinational 
government of the EU was seen to be unresponsive to local needs, with the centre of EU 
bureaucracy “divorced” from member countries. Returning accountability to the UK was a further 
priority for this group.
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WALES
A total of ten people took part in the Wales workshop: three who voted to leave the EU, and seven 
who voted to remain. A further four Leave voters were interviewed after the workshop. 
Those who voted Leave in Wales reported concerns about the lack of easy communications 
and transport links in their areas. They felt that it was difficult to reach certain parts of Wales, 
such as the Heads of the Valleys in South Wales, which in turn made it harder for businesses to 
be established outside of larger cities. Several participants reported that there were few major 
employers in rural areas, with coal mines closed and a reduction in the number of people employed 
at steelworks, although technology companies were growing. Within the cities, more opportunities 
were reported. Cardiff and the surrounding area was identified as a central hub for employment, with 
large employers in the region including British Airways, Aston Martin and Cardiff Airport. In addition, 
tourism was important, as were local council roles and retail jobs.
Participants in rural locations were proud of their local area and felt it had natural beauty. Strong 
community links were reported, particularly in the villages, where respondents reported attending 
clubs including pre-school groups, social groups for older people, language classes, Weight 
Watchers and University of Third Age. This was seen as more unusual in cities, where community 
ties were less present.
Leave voters in Wales reported concerns about the integration of immigrants, with the group 
reporting that, in certain areas of Welsh cities, the majority of the population were Muslim or Polish 
immigrants. While several participants gave examples of previous generations of immigrants 
successfully integrating into mining towns in the past, some felt that it was now intimidating for 
white Welsh people to visit certain areas, particularly in cities. There were concerns about changes 
to Welsh identity and culture through immigration, which could lead to a “domino” effect across the 
UK, with a multiracial society replacing British identities.
In contrast to those in the Scottish group (see above), there were fewer concerns about increasing 
Wales’ political power following EU exit. The group was supportive of the view that the four UK 
nations should work more closely together, with a preference for UK-wide rather than devolved 
policy making, although equity across the regions and nations was important – in particular for 
ensuring that Wales was as important as London in decision-making. A closer relationship between 
Wales and England was welcomed, with Welsh nationalism rejected by the group. Differences in 
Covid-19 lockdown policies between the two countries were given as examples of where the UK 
should act as one entity, rather than four countries. The Welsh Parliament was unpopular with some. 
Several participants reported that a devolved assembly meant that people felt closer to the Welsh 
government than the UK government, although the Welsh government was less powerful.
Participants also felt that there were too many layers of government for Wales. Leaving the EU 
would mean that the UK would be more politically “nimble”. For the group, this meant trading with 
the rest of the world and being exempt from EU rules and regulations, although there were hopes 
that the UK would remain close to Europe, in a similar position to that of Norway or Switzerland. 
Financially, a priority for this group was revitalising the Welsh economy through development of 
infrastructure, funded by central government, and support for town centres. Higher education and 
tourism were two potential areas of growth for the economy, while the NHS required more funding 
to rise to the same level of quality as services in England.
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WEST MIDLANDS
A total of 21 people took part in the West Midlands workshop: 14 who voted to leave the EU, and 
seven who voted to remain.
Participants predominantly lived in Birmingham or in the surrounding countryside, and the majority 
had been born in the West Midlands region. Those living in Birmingham reported that the city was 
extremely diverse. There were some concerns about local deprivation and fly tipping. Residents 
of the city appreciated the large number of parks and green spaces and felt that this was often 
overlooked when driving in the city.
Other participants reported living in the countryside, with benefits including a slow pace of life and 
general “peace and quiet”. Participants felt that their areas were good places to bring up children, 
particularly due to the number of parks. However, for one participant, this was also associated with 
people having “old-fashioned” views. There were also concerns that the local sense of community, 
which participants had experienced in their childhoods, had diminished over time. Participants felt 
that the ‘Clap for Carers’ had brought their communities back together during lockdown.
Leave voters in the West Midlands saw Brexit as an opportunity to improve negative aspects of 
British life, including more funding for the police and prisons to prevent crime and more funding for 
youth clubs to provide structure for young people. Changes to immigration were part of this, with 
concerns in the group about a lack of integration between immigrants and British people. The group 
had mixed views about asylum seekers: participants suggested that “deserving” asylum seekers, 
who faced death in their home countries, should continue to stay in the UK, but also argued 
that some asylum seekers came to the UK solely for the generosity of the benefits system. The 
government was believed to lack control over immigration, leading to the UK being “taken over” by 
immigrants.
Changing demographics also had an impact on the group’s concept of British identity. Christianity 
was seen as a traditional part of British identity, and participants were concerned that other religions 
were respected more than Christianity, with examples given of multi-faith assemblies held in schools 
while Nativity plays were said to have been banned. Leaving the EU was viewed as an opportunity 
to reflect on national identity, which was seen as currently “apathetic” and too politically correct. Yet 
views on identity varied across the group, with one black participant reporting discomfort with the 
concept of a British identity due to perceived associations with racism and the National Front.
Like Leave voters in the North East and Scotland, those in the West Midlands wanted to see local 
industry redevelop after leaving the EU. Participants reported a lack of employment for young 
people in the local area and wanted British workers to be prioritised. However, there was also a 
belief that British people were unwilling to take low-paid jobs. For these voters, a change in attitude 
was essential in stopping people from relying on benefits and taking on low-paid work instead. Yet 
while the group supported jobs for British workers, there was a recognition that immigrants should 
be valued especially in sectors such as farm labouring. 
Finally, there were mixed views on whether leaving the EU would bring positive changes to laws 
and regulations. Aspects of EU policy were welcomed – such as limiting carbon emissions across 
Europe and promoting tolerance and equality – but others were seen as over-bearing, such as 
defining what constitutes a sausage in law. Concerns about losing workers’ rights were expressed, 
with the group suggesting that strong trade unions would fill this role after leaving the EU.
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YORKSHIRE AND THE HUMBER
A total of 19 people took part in the Yorkshire and Humber workshop; 11 who voted to leave the EU, 
and eight who voted to remain.
Leave voters in Yorkshire and the Humber came from across the region, with participants reporting 
high satisfaction with their local areas. A number of respondents lived in Leeds, and said that 
they lived in small communities, with good shops and local high streets. Infrastructure was also 
important, with green spaces, roads and public transport valued by the group. This area was seen 
as a good place to bring up children, with friendly neighbours. Participants reported a lack of racial 
diversity. Those living in smaller towns and villages in Yorkshire also reported strong community ties 
and enjoyed living in open, green spaces.
A key priority for Leave voters in Yorkshire and the Humber was investing in British workers and 
giving British people educational and economic opportunities. This was related to concerns 
about crime, with young people seen at risk of leaving school and entering into criminal activity. 
The group advocated advertising all roles to UK workers before recruiting overseas workers and 
suggested that those in the armed forces should also receive priority. However, the group did not 
identify as anti-immigration, and although they were not in favour of freedom of movement, spoke 
positively about the work ethic of eastern European workers. Instead, participants thought that the 
immigration system should be made fairer, giving examples of computer programmers from India 
and teachers from Australia who currently could not easily work in the UK. Participants felt that 
immigration to the UK should not be based on one’s country of origin, but instead should focus 
on the skills need of the UK economy. This would combat several issues identified by the group, 
including overuse of cheap labour from eastern Europe and the ‘brain-drain’ of skilled professionals 
from developing countries.
Independent decision-making was also a key priority within this group, with one participant 
describing EU membership as “barbaric” for determining parts of UK legislation. EU laws were 
seen as unsuitable for the UK because making a single decision for all 28 member states would 
mean that legislation could not be tailored to the needs of individual countries. Furthermore, the 
EU political system was difficult to understand, with a lack of clarity surrounding the Commission, 
Council and Parliament. In contrast, the UK system was easily understood, and the power of one’s 
vote was more apparent, leading to greater political accountability. 
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Important issues
The workshop overviews demonstrate a clear convergence of the views of Leave voters on immigration 
and governance and how these relate to identity. The discussion in Scotland was an exception to this, 
with a clearer emphasis on the economy. The following section sets out further detail on these cross-
cutting themes before exploring what might be significant in the framing of these perspectives. 
 SOCIETY 
The question of immigration was frequently brought up by Leave voters, with two main concerns raised.
The first was a perceived lack of integration of immigrant communities in the UK. There was a view that 
integration was in some ways failing in communities, which was illustrated by participants’ views that 
many immigrants do not speak English. There were also concerns about segregation and certain areas 
of towns becoming unrecognisable. 
“They’re such tight communities that they all live together, and they don’t find it necessary to 
actually speak English because they don’t involve themselves in the British culture. I think that’s 
why a lot of people are so against immigrants coming into this country.” [Leave, East, female]
In some groups, these discussions were also linked to perceptions about increases in crime and fears 
of violent extremism. These conversations did not make explicit reference to race or ethnicity. However, 
immigrant groups that featured in these discussions were mainly ethnic minorities (for instance, Turkish, 
Somali, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Muslim groups) although Polish immigrants were also 
sometimes mentioned. 
The second concern related to the view that immigrants should – and in some cases were perceived not 
to – make a contribution to the UK.
“There’s too many people coming in, and those people, there are a lot that don’t actually 
contribute to the economy here.” [Leave, London and South East, male]
There was a strong belief that many immigrants put pressure on public services and a view that people 
move to the UK to access benefits because the UK has a generous system and is seen as a “soft touch”. 
In a number of groups this was referenced by the idea that the UK’s asylum system was being taken 
advantage of. This discussion was linked with concerns about a lack of integration, as participants 
largely held the view that people could not contribute if they were not integrated. While participants did 
distinguish between immigrants that they felt did contribute (for example, Chinese immigrants and some 
eastern European workers), there was still a sense that the UK had finite resources that were put under 
pressure from the number of arrivals each year. In these discussions, the UK was often described as a 
“small island” that was already “bursting at the seams” with people.
 GOVERNANCE
Alongside immigration, governance was the other fundamental concern in voting to leave the EU. The 
value of having sovereignty, independence and control was what mattered to participants and, once 
again, the significance of Britain being an island was raised.
“I just think we are an island and we should be independent.” [Leave, East, female]
Three main reasons were given as to why these issues mattered. Firstly, Leave-voting participants 
viewed laws that had come from the EU as lacking legitimacy. There was a view that the EU was not 
democratic, that people in the UK did not get a vote and therefore that the rules were all made by 
“unelected” people and then “imposed” on the UK against its will. These laws and regulations were seen 
as “absurd” or “silly”. 
“Some of the decisions that are made in Europe that are imposed upon us, that we just say, ‘Well, 
that’s ludicrous. Why are we following that law when we think it doesn’t actually make sense?’ 
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So, maybe we have some more independence to make rational decisions, rather than just follow 
something because it was agreed in Brussels or wherever.” [Leave, West Midlands, male]
An example given was the role of EU courts. This was discussed with particular reference to human 
rights, where the idea of the UK government being obliged to give prisoners the right to vote was raised. 
There was a view that decisions made in UK courts should not be able to be overturned in EU courts. 
Secondly, participants thought that if the UK made its own laws they would be more appropriate to the 
needs of the UK. It was felt that the UK would be able to be more flexible and nimble in its law-making, 
as previously the UK government had had its “hands tied by EU law”. The “one size fits all” approach 
that the EU was seen to espouse was thought to be inherently problematic, as it was impossible for 
the same rules to be suitable for so many countries. Participants felt it was important that laws and 
regulations were responsive to local needs and they felt that decisions taken at a local level would 
achieve this. 
Finally, for Welsh and Scottish Leave groups, there was a view that there should a fairer distribution 
of powers across the UK. For the Scottish group this primarily meant more power for the Scottish 
government, although there was a recognition that some things, such as foreign policy, should be 
handled at the UK level. For the Welsh group, there were mixed views on the devolved institutions in 
Wales. While all participants recognised the unequal power distribution between Westminster and Wales, 
some felt the solution lay in strengthening the devolved powers while others felt that there were too 
many layers of government in Wales.
 IDENTITY
The question of identity was also clearly important to Leave participants but mostly in relation to matters 
of immigration or governance, as described above. In groups in England, participants often referred 
interchangeably to English and British identity, whereas in Wales and Scotland, participants appeared to 
distinguish between Welsh or Scottish identities and British identity, while also often conflating both. 
Among Leave-voting participants in England and Wales there was a view that the UK had been too 
accommodating of other cultures that had come to the UK through immigration, one result of which was 
a loss of identity. Key to their understanding of British identity was being open and welcoming, freedom 
of speech and Christianity - aspects they deemed under threat due to the perceived lack of integration 
by some immigrant communities. 
“My strong opinion is that all people coming here, they have to be involved in this culture (…) I 
think most of the British people voted to leave because they want to save British identity, and 
this is the main purpose of Brexit.” [Leave, London and the South East, male]
Some participants in England and Wales explicitly linked becoming a more multi-racial and multi-
religious society to their feelings of unease and fear that British identities were being changed or lost in 
some way. As an example, the devoutness of Muslims was contrasted with the decline in value of the 
Christian faith in British society. Linked to this was a view that society had become too politically correct 
and thus a core British value – freedom of speech - was under threat. Reflecting her view of the situation 
in Wales and more widely at the UK level, one participant commented: 
“We’ve become a nation - and I think this is across the UK - of being frightened almost in saying 
anything without fear of offending somebody” [Leave, Wales, female]
This in turn meant, as they saw it, that key British traditions, such as the school Nativity play, were under 
threat. As a result, British identities were slowly being erased. 
However, this discussion was nuanced within groups, with a handful of participants challenging the idea 
that political correctness – as a characteristic constraining British identity - was purely problematic. They 
made the point that it was right that certain comments that had been acceptable in the past were no 
longer deemed acceptable. There was also a view that British identity was more complex today and was 
explicitly multi-racial, with one Welsh participant expressing annoyance with “idiots” who implied that 
being British was equated with being “Anglo Saxon”. This handful of participants were critical of a sense 
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of nostalgia in trying to return to past ideas about identity. 
“What are we going to do? Are we going to kick out everybody who doesn’t conform to what 
was 100 years ago, the English person?” [Leave, West Midlands, male]
These discussions tended to occur in groups that contained ethnic minority participants – in London and 
the South East, and the West Midlands – who made reference to their own experiences. 
Relatedly, there was broad agreement across groups in England about a desire to reclaim symbols of 
British and English identity – particularly the flag (both the Union Jack and the St George’s Cross) – and 
to restore pride in those symbols. Participants lamented that flags were only flown on special occasions 
and wanted to disassociate them from connections with the far right.
“We were proud to display the flag. I want that to return. I want people to be reminded how we 
should be proud of our country and we should look after it.” [Leave, South West, female]
The other key theme here was associated with people’s concerns about governance. In this view, the 
UK making its own laws – being “captain of our ship” - was fundamental to restoring pride in British 
identity. From this perspective, regaining decision-making powers was also connected to having greater 
autonomy over investment decisions in industry and there was a strong desire to be more self-sufficient 
in many ways. 
“What it means to be British (…) it’s thinking about doing more in-house.”  
[Leave, West Midlands, female] 
Implicit in these views was a certain degree of nostalgia for a time when Britain was seen to have 
managed on its own, had been an industrial powerhouse and when there had been more “common 
sense” in decision-making. 
In the Scottish Leave group, identity was discussed less explicitly as an issue of importance, although a 
sense of shared Scottish identity appeared to be taken for granted by participants. However, there were 
differences within the group, with some participants identifying only as Scottish while others identified 
as both Scottish and British. Nevertheless, there was broad agreement on the importance of devolved 
powers and identity was discussed in relation to questions of governance with the other UK nations, and 
the role of the Scottish National Party. 
 ECONOMY
There were three main areas that mattered most for Leave voters when thinking about the economy: 
autonomy over trade relationships, prioritisation of British people for jobs and a return of manufacturing. 
However, although participants acknowledged the importance of the economy, these issues tended 
not to be considered the most important in making the decision to leave the EU. Instead, the economy 
was talked about more in the context of participants’ priorities for the future (see Chapter 3) and their 
expectations about changes to come (see Chapter 4). 
Linked to the theme of independence and sovereignty, autonomy over trade relationships was an 
important issue for Leave voters. The UK being able to conduct its own trade negotiations and not be 
constrained by EU rules was seen as crucial in order to thrive economically. 
“I think it’s the removal of the restrictions, the restrictions to do trades with other countries.” 
[Leave, North East, male]
Opportunities for trade were identified with countries such as China, Japan, Brazil, India, the US and 
Canada. Some participants were wary about a future trade deal with the US and the potential lowering of 
food standards, but there was an expectation that the UK could and would uphold its own standards in 
future trade deals. 
The second economic concern for Leave voters was the prioritisation of jobs for British people. There 
was something of a contradiction in terms in how participants framed this discussion. On the one hand, 
there was a desire to invest in training and education for young British people and to prioritise them for 
jobs. On the other hand, there were negative views about British people’s perceived lack of work ethic 
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and a recognition that many immigrants did worthwhile jobs that British people did not want to do. 
The third key issue identified was a return of manufacturing and the development of new industries. 
This matter was particularly highlighted in Wales, the North East, Scotland and the West Midlands. 
Participants identified several potential strengths in the UK economy, including technology, green energy 
production, medical research and freeports. At the time of the fieldwork, that the UK was the fifth-largest 
economy was cited as a reason why it would be successful outside the EU. 
“We’re one of the strongest economies in the world, I believe. Not the strongest by any means, 
but we’re far, far stronger than our counterparts throughout Europe, in my opinion.”  
[Leave, Wales, male] 
Finally, it is worth comparing these ‘Leaver’ priorities with the much higher level of concern about the 
economy, relative to other issues when thinking about exiting the EU among Remain groups. Participants 
were concerned about the loss of specific industries in their local areas, particularly car makers in the 
East, North East and Yorkshire. More widely, Remain-voting participants were concerned about the 
loss of EU funding for infrastructure, research and agriculture. Remain groups also raised issues of the 
potential for lowering standards for new trade deals, with this appearing as a particular risk from a trade 
deal with the US. The potential reduction in migrant labour for sectors such as agriculture and health and 
social care was an issue of concern (a point acknowledged by Leave-voting participants as well - see 
Chapter 4), as was the potential impact on local tourism if travel between the UK and EU becomes more 
difficult. 
Underlying narratives 
A notable aspect of discussions – in both Leave and Remain groups – was that sometimes views had 
been shaped by information that may not be entirely accurate or by overly simplified narratives. In the 
workshops, participants occasionally acknowledged this issue, commenting on the difficulty of knowing 
what to believe about the Brexit debate and the promises related to staying in or leaving the EU. 
Misperceptions and misunderstandings arose in a number of different ways. Some were driven by media 
narratives, whereas others were derived from messaging from the EU referendum campaign. Some 
appeared to be shaped by a combination of personal experiences and anecdotal stories. Finally, others 
were simply the result of a lack of information or a conflation of unrelated issues. However, even when 
participants acknowledged that certain pieces of information might not be true, often this recognition did 
not lead to a wholesale shift in the views expressed. 
Across the Leave groups the Vote Leave campaign messages of ‘taking back control’ and in particular 
‘control of borders, money and laws’ had resonated with notable strength. This phraseology was 
repeatedly referenced.
Leave-voting participants also appeared to align with the Vote Leave campaign message that ‘unelected 
EU bureaucrats’ were in charge of deciding rules in the EU, while that some participants acknowledged 
that the UK held democratic elections to the European Parliament. 
Similarly, in respect to human rights, participants were concerned about EU courts overruling UK courts. 
Participants appeared to conflate cases before the European Court of Human Rights with the European 
Court of Justice, despite the former not being a European Union institution. In one case, a participant 
acknowledged that on the issue of human rights, it is “more complicated than it was made out” [Leave, 
North East, male]. However, the general disquiet about having court decisions imposed remained.
On the subject of immigration, views appeared to be shaped by wider media narratives and, to some 
degree, by personal experiences, combined with anecdotal stories. Leave participants’ concerns over 
immigration were rarely specifically focused on EU migration, and hence closely tied to the issue of 
Brexit. In discussions about the perceived lack of integration, participants usually identified non-EU 
migrant groups, which was occasionally acknowledged. 
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“There was confusion because I think a lot of people were referring to immigrants that weren’t 
from the EU anyway” [Leave, East, male]
However, participants felt that immigrants in general put undue pressure on public services. Whilst 
acknowledging the fact that EU immigrants did contribute through working, the wider concern around 
the lack of contribution made by immigrants remained. 
Some Remain voters showed similar concerns over immigration to those expressed above. This led 
to some broad areas of agreement between these two groups. For instance, a handful of Remain 
participants acknowledged that some migrants may be “working the system” to get benefits which 
echoed the concern about a lack of contribution to the UK. However, these views did not appear to have 
been decisive in shaping their views on leaving the EU. Instead, one participant said that they had voted 
“instinctively” without full knowledge of the facts. 
Issues about the trustworthiness of sources of information were raised in both groups. In particular, 
the media was thought to sensationalise stories and to push certain agendas. This was felt to be bad 
for society in many ways, but in particular in terms of how it promoted division in the context of the 
referendum and its aftermath.
“A lot of the media inflames a lot of people’s opinions I think, changes people’s opinions. We get 
a lot of false information these days. I’d like to see that put paid to really and somebody must be 
able to stop all of this interfering false news, because how can we have valued opinions when 
we only go by what we read and what we hear in the media?” [Leave, South West, female]
“The media doesn’t give a balanced view any more. It’s all about selling newspapers or selling 
time on the television or whatever. So they sensationalise things. So whichever side of the coin 
you look at, if there’s some issue around racism or whatever, it’s sensationalised, which almost 
has a detrimental effect on the way some people might think in the UK sometimes. The media 
has got an awful lot of power to influence things and I don’t think the way they report things are 
always in the best interests of the nation as a whole” [Remain, West Midlands, female]
Participants acknowledged that the media played a powerful role in shaping views, but it was not 
common in workshops for people to critically engage with media driven narratives in distinguishing 
between accurate and inaccurate information.
 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has highlighted the cross-cutting issues of concern for Leave-voting participants, which 
were strongly weighted to issues of immigration and governance. These two issues linked closely to 
discussions of identity. Participants’ perception of a lack of pride in British identity, alongside a feeling 
that this identity was under threat, was the main concern of those who voted to Leave. 
The exception to the focus on immigration, governance and identity, was the Scotland Leave group. 
Alongside Remain groups, this Scottish group focused more on the question of the economy when 
discussing what mattered about leaving the EU. 
Our analysis also sought to identify what narratives or information participants commonly drew on in 
articulating their views. These had been influenced by media narratives, official campaign messages, 
personal experiences and anecdotal sources. In some cases, views were built on misapprehensions 
or inaccurate information, or were the result of participants lacking information or conflating unrelated 
issues. 
The following chapter will explore what issues mattered most to participants. Chapter four then 
discusses the actual changes people anticipated as a result of Brexit and the degree to which those 
aligned with their priorities and concerns.
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Priorities for Comfortable  
Leavers after Brexit 
This chapter explores the priorities participants identified for their communities, and more widely, 
when thinking about the changes Brexit could bring. The priorities speak both to concerns about EU 
membership and to a much wider set of grievances that broadly embodied the things participants saw 
as having been wrong with the ‘state of the nation’ until now. 
In both cases, participants were quick to identify the broad types of changes they would like to see. 
However, they generally struggled to convey a meaningful sense of detail about how or to what extent it 
was likely their priorities might be realised as a result of changes to our membership of the EU. 
This chapter addresses priorities for governance, society and the economy in turn. 
For Governance
Two priorities emerged in relation to governance. At the parliamentary level, restoration of sovereignty 
was key. With respect to their regional and local communities, participants also hoped for new modes of 
engagement in politics.
 RESTORING SOVEREIGNTY 
Brexit was seen as an opportunity to restore parliamentary sovereignty. Unique to Leavers, this priority 
was underpinned by the belief that EU law restricted Britain’s ability to act in its own interests. As 
identified in Chapter 2, Leavers hoped Britain would become more independent and influential through 
Brexit.
Leavers named border control, fishing, agriculture and trade as key sectors they thought had suffered 
under EU membership. The EU’s fishing and agricultural policies were considered wasteful, with the 
overproduction of milk and obligations to discard surplus fish given as examples. A smaller number of 
Leavers also stressed the importance of maintaining influence on global politics post-Brexit, for example 
via continued involvement in the G7 and intervention on global human rights issues. In London and the 
South East, Leavers agreed that Britain should continue to collaborate with the EU on issues like climate 
change and international crime. 
A number of Leavers tended to discuss the need for sovereignty in exaggerated terms. For example, by 
sharing their view that the European Commission must be consulted “every time any form of law needs 
to be amended, or regulation changed” [Leave, Wales, Male]. Another participant suggested that Brexit 
would mean the government would “be able to run this country exactly the way they want to” [Leave, 
North East, Male]. These perspectives were stated without recognition that Britain would remain bound 
to international agreements such as those set out by the WTO and the recent trade agreement with the 
EU. 
Others cited Britain’s history or geography as reference points for the kind of nation it should become 
post-Brexit. For example, by suggesting that Britain should act like a “smaller British empire once again” 
[Leave, West Midlands, male] or by suggesting that it would make sense for Britain to act independently 
because it is an island nation.
Though restoration of sovereignty was not a priority for Remainers, they too stressed the importance of 
maintaining influence on the world stage. However, they saw close collaboration with the EU as being 
more important to this than Leavers generally did. 
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 NEW MODES OF ENGAGEMENT IN POLITICS
Brexit was also viewed by participants as an opportunity to carve out new platforms for engagement in 
local, regional and national politics. Driving this was the idea that the British political system did not do 
enough to guarantee equal representation for all communities and demographics. 
LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
Leavers were keen to see a more ‘bottom up’ style of local governance that would better account for 
local needs. A variety of ideas were put forward about the forms this could take:
•  Some participants wanted better allocated funding. For example, Leavers in the North East 
complained that expensive, large-scale projects such as HS2 appeared to take priority over basic 
local needs. 
•  Some suggested that direct citizens’ votes on spending would help decide this in a way that greater 
benefited local communities. 
Another view was that MPs were not doing enough to understand local priorities or communicate them 
with Westminster. People thought it was important to have new platforms of engagement to facilitate 
dialogue. In the North East and West Midlands, Leavers suggested that public consultations and citizens 
panels could offer a way forward and help to address differences in representation between deprived 
and privileged communities. Leavers in the West Midlands picked up on and praised Marcus Rashford’s 
involvement in the food poverty debate. They suggested that further involvement of celebrities in 
politics would help raise the profile of such issues, further pinpointing the feeling that, without reform, 
government could not be relied on to account for the most basic of local concerns.
Participants spoke positively about the passion teenagers and school children had for topics such as 
Black Lives Matter. However, they worried about the under-representation of this demographic and 
thought it was due to a lack of platform for these groups to engage meaningfully on such issues. One 
Leaver in the West Midlands had experience of direct involvement in local youth engagement forums and 
complained that initiatives had stopped due to funding cuts.
DEVOLUTION
Across groups, participants acknowledged that Westminster did not give equal voice to Britain’s regional 
concerns. To address this, several changes to devolution were favoured. 
Participants in central and southern England tended to want more centralised governance that better 
integrated concerns from across each nation. They argued, for example, that disparities in tuition fees 
and nurses’ pay were unfair. They also felt Westminster should be able to enact laws equally across UK 
nations in response to issues of national importance, such as Covid-19. 
Some Leavers in the East and North East complained that England did not have a devolved parliament 
to voice its concerns directly, despite having the largest economy and population. 
“We’ve got a UK government that supposedly speaks for the UK, but [. . .] who’s speaking for 
England?” [Leave, East, male]
Welsh Leavers expressed varying degrees of support for devolution. There was some consensus that 
devolution has brought improvements to local Welsh communities and one hope was that, through 
Brexit, Wales will have stronger lawmaking powers. This was considered important for strengthening 
Welsh identity. In contrast, one Leaver argued that devolution has introduced unnecessary levels of 
bureaucracy, wasted resources and led to poor integration between local authorities and social services. 
The introduction and subsequent scale back of 22 local health boards was given as one example. 
Therefore, within this group, one priority was less about the extent of devolution but a more efficient 
distribution of money and resources under the current devolved institutions.
A number of Welsh Leavers commented that Covid-19 has highlighted inconsistencies in governance 
across devolved nations and some would have preferred a “one size fits all approach”. 
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Remainers voiced similar concerns to Leavers about political engagement and put forward many similar 
proposals on possible new approaches. In the South West, participants were particularly concerned 
about further supporting politically and environmentally engaged youth. 
On devolution, Scottish Remainers tended to favour greater decentralisation, but didn’t go as far as to 
favour independence. They complained that Westminster had failed to act on Scottish concerns because 
it was wrapped up in its own “bubble”. 
 “… it would have been much nicer for Scotland to have its own little grouping to look after itself. 
The government’s much more local and much more intense, rather than a Westminster bubble 
that seems to be totally immersed in its own ends.” [Remain, Scotland, male]
For Society
Three priorities were discussed by Leavers in relation to society: on immigration, attitudes to 
employment, and identity.
 IMMIGRATION
Participants viewed Brexit as an opportunity to reconsider who was allowed to live and work in Britain. 
Views of Leavers were generally driven by a desire for greater control. At the same time, remaining 
welcoming was also a priority, with the two sometimes in conflict. 
CONTROL AS GREATER PRIORITY
Controlling immigration was a priority unique to Leavers, to whom it meant various things. For some, it 
meant tougher border control without necessarily tougher settlement criteria. These participants hoped 
Britain would be able to monitor its borders more closely, independently dictate what documentation 
was required to enter, and to decide for itself what rights migrants had upon entry. 
Controlling immigration also meant introducing criteria that barred the entry of migrants who would 
immediately depend on state support; for example, by introducing stricter pre-requisites around proof 
of employment or ability to find it. Underpinning this was a desire to protect Britain’s benefits system, 
which Leavers praised highly but argued needed protecting from migrants they viewed as undeserving. 
Several Leavers protested that if British people living in countries such as Greece or Spain could not 
claim benefits then neither should migrants living in Britain. One Leaver in the West Midlands, for 
example, suggested that Britain’s net wealth had decreased under free movement due to an increase of 
remittance outflows2, which should therefore be banned post-Brexit. 
To others, controlling immigration meant introducing criteria that barred the entry of migrants below a 
certain skill level. The Australian immigration system was referenced as a model for this, but Leavers did 
not convey a sense of how it should work in Britain. However, they did argue it was needed to prevent 
the entry of foreign workers into low-paid jobs, such as fruit picking, which currently made it too easy for 
unmotivated British people to claim benefits instead of working. 
BEING WELCOMING
Participants were generally concerned about how migrants perceived Britain. They shared a hope that 
Britain would continue to be seen as a welcoming place to live and work, but the reasons given for this 
differed by vote.
2 Remittance outflows are transfers of money to other countries. They are typically made by migrants to people living in their 
country of origin.
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Leavers valued the economic benefits free movement afforded Britain. This included ease of settlement 
for highly educated students and workers who contributed to scientific advancement in areas such 
as the environment. Leavers living in tourist-dependent areas, such as Harrogate, also emphasised 
the importance of being able to easily attract tourists. While Leavers said that Britain may come to be 
perceived as intolerant or racist as a result of the Brexit vote, they did not generally elaborate on this 
concern further than suggesting that Britain would lose out economically because of it. 
Remainers not only valued free movement for its economic benefits, but also for the intercultural 
exchanges it facilitated via work, travel and education. A Scottish Remainer protested that politics 
reduced migrants to their economic contribution when Britain benefited from their cultural influence. 
Remainers feared that because of Brexit, British people would struggle to empathise with migrants and 
attitudes would harden. One solution put forward was furthering the teaching of European languages, 
and wider cultural initiatives, in schools. 
“If politicians are portraying that as something, ‘We’re doing it for the cash, we’re doing it for the 
demographics, but we don’t really want these people to be here, we don’t value them’, then 
that message will come across in the media. It will stick in people’s minds, and they won’t be as 
open to integrating the different cultures, I think. I’m really quite worried about that.”  
[Remain, Scotland, female]
 ATTITUDES TO EMPLOYMENT
Participants also viewed Brexit as an opportunity for Britain to realign collective attitudes around which 
types of work were considered valuable and worthwhile. Brexit was considered an important time to 
achieve this because, until now, Britain had depended on a pool of foreign labour that would significantly 
decrease. 
Leavers across groups perceived there to be an unwillingness amongst unemployed British people to 
seek work in low-paid jobs, despite unmet demand. One Leaver in the West Midlands believed that, 
until now, a popular excuse had been that EU migrants were taking these jobs. Others attributed this 
perceived lack of work ethic to Britain’s benefits system which, as they argued in relation to migrants, 
made it too easy for undeserving people to claim something for nothing. 
Leavers also felt it wrong that British people tended to perceive vocational work as being a less valid, 
worthwhile and necessarily lower-paid alternative to the pursuit of careers that follow higher education. 
Personal anecdotes were given of having been “brainwashed” about university in school or frowned 
upon for considering alternatives. It was seen as counterproductive to place such emphasis on pursuing 
higher education when there was great unmet demand for vocational workers, locally and nationally, in 
jobs such as health and social care, teaching and the skilled trades. To accompany a shift in mindset, 
they argued that the availability and quality of training schemes, apprenticeships and careers services 
should be improved for school leavers. 
Remainers did not voice the same concerns about Leavers in relation to low-paid jobs but they did share 
many of the same concerns about vocational work. However, they generally discussed those concerns 
to a lesser extent. 
 NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Participants saw the EU referendum as having heightened Britain’s social divides and in general felt it 
important that Britain had a clear sense of identity to unite over post-Brexit. However, there was not a 
clear sense across groups of what this identity should be. 
Participants in Scotland and Wales articulated a sense of Scottish or Welsh identity to varying degrees. 
Some felt strongly patriotic towards Scotland or Wales, whilst others identified as British, or held a dual 
sense of identity. In the Scottish group, some Leavers argued that Scottish produce should be prioritised 
post-Brexit. In Wales, one Leaver complained that the growing presence of migrants in cities such as 
Cardiff and Newport had made those places feel less Welsh. Participants generally did not discuss how 
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such concerns about identity might be acted on as a result of Brexit. One Welsh Leaver argued that “the 
other issues are far more important than, how Welsh do we feel?” [Leave, Wales, male]. 
Leavers tended to centre their identity on the past, evoking times they felt had gone by when the national 
anthem and British (or English) flag were proud reminders of what it meant to be British (or English). The 
Second World War was referenced as a time when people were encouraged to “Buy British”, and the 
post-war years as a time when other advertising slogans such as “Keep Britain Tidy” were associated 
with Britishness. Leavers expressed disappointment at the perceived lack of respect shown by young 
people for such national traditions. Some felt their freedom of cultural or religious expression had come 
under attack. For example, one Leaver in the South West complained about the sign of the cross being 
removed from a local crematorium for fear of offending others. A Leaver in London and the South East 
was disheartened at the association of the St George’s cross with the far right. 
Remainers tended to focus not on the past but on the growing feeling Britain was an uncaring nation. 
They hoped Britain might carve out a forward-facing identity centered on a duty of care for others, 
and to the world. They suggested Britain might achieve this by championing standards in care for the 
environment, for its elderly population and by encouraging a sense of global citizenship.
“We [ageing British people] are - and I include myself in that - we are the largest growing sector 
in the marketplace, in the UK. The government just tend to think we’re not worth investing in.” 
[Remain, East, male]
“…what we’re all talking about, is being a society that cares. Yes, caring for everyone and all 
creatures. How wonderful would that be?” [Remain, South West, female]
For the Economy
Three priorities were expressed in relation to the economy: post-Brexit trade, British industry, and 
investment and funding.
 POST-BREXIT TRADE 
Leavers were mostly clear on the provisions of EU membership they wanted left out of any agreement; 
for example, the need to follow EU VAT rules on all products and to make annual budget contributions to 
the EU. A smaller number of Leavers were willing to see certain priorities, such as greater sovereignty or 
immigration control, take lower preference if it guaranteed an otherwise favourable agreement. Leavers 
were less clear on the benefits of EU membership they wanted to see protected in a potential agreement. 
However, they generally wanted to maintain some degree of reciprocal free movement, albeit on Britain’s 
terms. 
By contrast, Remainers were happier to maintain provisions of EU membership in their current form, 
including freedom of movement, and wanted to strike a deal that entailed closer cooperation with the EU. 
Participants on both sides of the vote generally concurred that a close, mutually beneficial agreement 
with the EU would be preferable. They hoped that Britain would promptly move beyond the antagonism 
that has characterised negotiations to date and strike an agreement without a further extension to the 
deadline. 
 BRITISH INDUSTRY
The types of industry considered important by Leavers varied by workshop location, but all groups 
shared a common desire to see more goods produced in Britain and to higher standards. Food, 
manufacturing and post-industrial services, such as tourism, emerged as three main industries in which 
to prioritise post-Brexit growth. 
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FOOD INDUSTRY
Leavers generally wanted to maintain high food standards post-Brexit. However, views varied on exactly 
what was acceptable.
Some Leavers felt it important that Britain maintained the highest food standards possible. One Leaver 
in the North East even viewed Brexit as an opportunity to adopt standards higher than those of the EU. 
They were concerned about potential trade agreements with countries such as the US, the possibility 
that food standards might drop as a result and that products such as chlorinated chicken might be 
introduced. One exception was another Leaver in the North East who was willing to accept such 
concessions if it secured a US trade deal that benefited the British economy – so long as food was 
clearly labelled.
Other Leavers argued strongly that where food could be produced nationally it should always be the 
first choice of consumers and retailers. They said that eating food produced locally, or nationally, gave 
them confidence that the conditions in which it had been grown and kept were high. Another argument 
was that local producers needed support from British consumers more than ever. To encourage a shift 
in loyalty towards British produce, they suggested governments and supermarkets should bring back 
“Buy British” advertising campaigns. To prioritise affordability, they suggested maximising government 
subsidies for producers and supermarkets. A number of Leavers were willing to see the range of choice 
limited to national produce as it is seasonally available. One Welsh Leaver stressed the importance of 
adopting and improving on farming subsidies set up by the EU. They identified small Welsh hill farms as 
one type of producer not supported under EU membership that should be prioritised post-Brexit. 
Remainers shared similar concerns about food standards and the implications of future trade deals 
with countries outside of the EU. A number also wanted to prioritise British produce post-Brexit, but 
the reasoning sometimes differed from that of Leave voters. For example, in Wales, one Remainer 
commented on the environmental benefits of becoming less dependent on imports. 
RE INDUSTRIALISATION VS POST-INDUSTRIALISATION
A range of Leavers from Scotland, Wales, the East, North East and West Midlands lived in areas that 
had undergone extensive de-industrialisation in the 20th century. They tended to idealise a rejuvenation 
of the steel and fossil-fuel-based industries that once characterised their communities. That said, they 
widely recognised that Britain’s resource depletion and competition with countries such as India and 
China would preclude successful attempts at doing so. In response to this challenge, some felt their 
areas should see a targeted shift towards green industry while others felt that a focus on light industry or 
post-industrial services should be the answer.
For participants living in areas once dependent on metal production for the provision of jobs, shifting to 
green energy production was once again favoured as a viable solution. For example, one Welsh Leaver 
living in Newport said that post-industrial decline had pushed the majority of young people out of the 
area, and often out of Wales, in search of work. She complained that a nearby windfarm was Spanish 
owned and produced, when developing the capacity to do it all locally would have created growth and 
jobs. Furthermore, she felt that the local area had untapped potential for tidal energy production.
A Leaver in the North East explained that his local area, Middlesbrough, had been founded on British 
steel. Traditionally, locals spent their lives in steel or petrochemical manufacturing jobs and he saw a 
spirit of hard work as characterising the “DNA” of local people. He took great pride in his local history, 
including the fact that Sydney Harbour Bridge had been manufactured in Teesside. However, he 
explained that de-industrialisation had brought decline and deprivation to the area and that without 
a rejuvenation of industry the region would lose its identity. He praised the recent shift towards the 
manufacture and export of wind farms and felt that further inward investment and the acquisition of 
freeport status would be key to this continuing. He also saw Brexit as a crucial opportunity to strengthen 
local industry. 
For other participants, shifting towards manufacturing consumer-based goods was a viable solution. 
They complained that production was too often outsourced to the cheapest global tender and suggested 
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Britain could challenge countries such as China by prioritising the quality, not quantity, of nationally 
produced goods, especially when they characterised the local area. One Scottish Leaver suggested 
that the kilts sold in Edinburgh Castle should be “‘Made in Scotland. Made in Perth” not “Made in 
China” (Leave, Scotland, male). Another Scottish Leaver suggested repurposing Aberdeen’s disused 
shipbuilding factories to produce food and clothing. EU regulations were considered by some to be 
barrier to innovation. To become more competitive, they wanted Britain to adopt a more entrepreneurial 
approach under which small business could thrive. For example, Leavers in the West Midlands 
complained that traditional pottery businesses had moved abroad and hoped that, through Brexit, they 
might get the support needed to operate successfully at a local level. 
Another set of participants considered post-industrial services to be the most viable replacement 
for heavy industry. A Welsh Leaver commented on the decline of steel production in Port Talbot. He 
explained that other areas within the region, such as The Gower and Swansea, were receiving increasing 
levels of tourism and maintaining this should be prioritised post-Brexit. A Scottish Leaver in Edinburgh 
echoed this, arguing that tourist-driven events such as Hogmanay and the Edinburgh Fringe should be 
capitalised on further because they created significant revenue and employment opportunities for the 
region.
 PRIORITIES FOR INVESTMENT & FUNDING
Participants placed great emphasis on the need for better investment and funding. They made 
few attempts to suggest how Brexit might enable this. However, many were taken with the idea 
that a significant amount of funding would materialise after Britain had ended its annual EU budget 
contributions, as discussed in the following chapter. They hoped any money freed up, or created, as a 
result of Brexit would be targeted at two key areas: infrastructure and public services.
INFRASTRUCTURE
In strengthening the post-Brexit economy and making it work better for people, Leavers hoped the 
government would prioritise the improvement of public transport nationwide. Some favoured large-
scale projects, such as HS2 or the Welsh intercity line, arguing that they would better enable people to 
commute to where their skills were needed. Another argument was that better transport would create a 
more socially connected Britain.
Leavers felt pessimistic about Britain’s lack of affordable housing supply. Older participants compared 
their experiences to those of today’s young adults. Participants wanted getting on the housing ladder to 
be something every young person could realistically aspire to, as this would give them more optimism 
about their future. It was suggested that the government should increase the availability of skilled 
tradespeople, which was needed to increase Britain’s housing supply and thereby lower the cost of 
housing. Some also criticised the current Help to Buy scheme for its limitations. One Scottish Leaver 
feared that many Conservative Party donors may wish to maintain the artificial inflation of house prices.
 
PUBLIC SERVICES
Public services that were identified as targets for greater post-Brexit funding included education and 
youth services, health and social care, local authorities, the police service and the armed forces. Of 
these, health and social care was discussed most extensively. 
Some aspects of EU funding were praised; for example, by one participant in Swansea who had 
benefited from theatre group funding. However, the decision making behind EU funding was questioned, 
and a number of Leavers felt spending could have been better targeted by first consulting local 
communities about their priorities. One group of Welsh Leavers, for example, argued that although EU 
funded cycle paths were beneficial, their first choice for spending would have been roads and railways, 
where the need for spending was considered greater.
Leavers tended not to argue that EU membership had negatively affected Britain’s own public service 
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funding. They agreed that post-Brexit funding should be allocated in a way that improves the quality and 
consistency of service provision nationwide, with a particular focus on communities they saw as having 
been underfunded in recent years. However, they were sceptical that Westminster could be trusted to 
properly address such inequalities.
Across Leave groups, better-funded health and social care was considered a key priority. Participants 
felt it was wrong that the NHS had faced such mounting pressure in recent years when it is one of the 
most highly valued and in-demand public services and will continue to be as Britain’s population ages 
further. Some Leavers thought migration had contributed to the problem, but without referencing EU 
migration specifically. One Leaver in the South West shared an anecdote from a relative working in the 
NHS, who suggested the cost of providing interpreters was “astronomical”. They further complained 
about health tourism, suggesting the NHS had been used as a “holiday hospital” by foreign nationals 
who returned home without paying for treatment. There was some consensus amongst Leavers that all 
foreign nationals should be made to provide proof of insurance or ability to pay outright before receiving 
treatment. Some also considered a small usage charge or tax increase for British residents acceptable if 
it helped stabilise the NHS.
Remainer views were broadly similar to those of Leavers on these points. With respect to infrastructure 
- Welsh Remainers felt there was a need to develop transport links between major Welsh cities and the 
heads of the Welsh valleys, as this would encourage business to take place within Wales and in turn 
generate economic growth. 
Improving the quality and consistency of public service provision nationally, with a focus on health and 
social care, was a key priority, though they were generally less critical of EU funding. As with Leavers, 
this group were also sceptical about trusting Westminster to act public service improvements.
 CONCLUSION
This chapter aimed to explain in more detail the issues participants most wanted to see addressed as a 
result of Brexit. They can be separated into priorities with direct relevance to Britain’s membership of the 
EU and connected priorities that participants nonetheless believed should be addressed as a result of 
leaving. 
In freeing itself from the conditions of EU membership which they deemed unfavourable Leavers wanted 
Britain to gain parliamentary sovereignty and independence. They believed this would afford it the 
influence needed to better control key issues such as immigration, trade, agriculture and the production 
of British goods. 
Participants also conveyed a sense of disillusionment around a wider ranging set of issues they believed 
had come to define the status quo in Britain since it joined the EU. The exact set of grievances identified 
differed by group, but they all shared the sense that the government had not done enough to understand 
such grievances or act in a way that tangibly improved the lives of those negatively affected by them. 
In some instances, participants made the argument that these negative effects had been worsened 
by Britain’s membership of the EU. In others, participants openly acknowledged that they were not 
directly related to Britain’s EU membership but hoped all the same that by leaving, in the words of one 
participant, “change will trigger change”. 
The following chapter examines some of these anticipated changes in more detail and how our 
workshop participants were looking to the future after Brexit.
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Anticipated changes from Brexit
This chapter presents the findings on the changes that participants thought would happen because of 
Brexit. Participants generally had difficulty articulating in specific detail what these changes might be. 
Groups were also more likely to talk about changes in certain domains, such as the economy, than in 
others, such as governance or society. This was in part linked to views about the combined effects of 
Brexit and Covid-19 at the time the research was conducted.
There was a high degree of uncertainty when discussing the future, in part due to the fact that 
negotiations on a future trade deal between the UK and the EU were still ongoing during our fieldwork. 
The potential for these negotiations to fail was felt to contribute to this uncertainty. Participants also felt 
in many cases that they did not have enough information to talk about potential changes. 
This chapter begins by discussing the economy, society, governance and identity, and then goes 
onto explore the perceptions of what was driving the need for change. The final section explores how 
participants viewed changes in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Differential impacts of changes from Brexit
In discussing the changes that they anticipated Brexit would bring, participants acknowledged the 
differential impacts for different groups or sectors in society. 
 ECONOMY 
There was a shared expectation across both Leave and Remain groups that there would be a negative 
economic impact from Brexit in the short term. Participants expected to see rising costs, particularly 
with respect to food, and a decline in living standards. Participants anticipated disruption to trade flows 
and an increase in difficulty for the UK to both import and export goods. Some participants identified the 
likelihood of an increase in trade bureaucracy and paperwork, and an increase in tariffs, as the causes. 
Both Leavers and Remainers noted that these changes would have uneven impacts across the country, 
with poorer groups, described as low-income families and the “have-nots”, likely to be worse affected. 
In contrast, some participants, in both groups, acknowledged that they may be relatively insulated from 
such changes:
“The great difficulties [sic] is going to be families that are affected that are low-income families. I 
think it will affect them more greatly than I think the majority of us - middle class,” [Leave, West 
Midlands, female]
Despite a broad convergence of views around short-term negative economic impacts, there was a 
strong sense among Leave groups that the economic situation would improve over the mid to long 
term. Leave voters expected to see a range of positive economic changes as a result of Brexit. These 
included increased targeting of investment in industries with the money that was no longer spent on EU 
membership, a return of manufacturing and better trade deals with other countries around the world. 
Perhaps more important for some Leave participants was that leaving the EU would engender a shift in 
mindset and a greater sense of entrepreneurial spirit in the UK.
“I’m hoping that coming out of the EU will free up more of that entrepreneurial spirit, if you 
like, in the economy (…) I’d like it [this country] to be more entrepreneurial and more wealth-
creating.” [Leave, Yorkshire, male]
These positive expectations appear to have been shaped by two prominent narratives of the 2016 Vote 
Leave referendum campaign. The first was the ability to recoup money spent on EU membership and re-
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invest it in line with UK priorities. Although a number of Leave-voting participants acknowledged that the 
amount promised during the referendum (£350 million per week) was not correct, there was still a strong 
belief that there would be a net gain. There was a view that this money would be spent more wisely and 
with greater accountability by UK politicians than in the hands of EU counterparts. 
As this monetary gain was understood in fairly straightforward book-keeping terms, with a simple return 
of money ‘saved’, rather than as part of a broader trade-off, participants were keen for transparency 
about how the money was spent.
“It hasn’t been publicised where they’ve made the saving from the EU spend, where that’s going 
to be pumped into. (…) Would it be good for them to actually say, ‘Well, this is how much we’ve 
saved.’ I know it’s very general at our level, but I think I would like to see where the savings 
have been made and what they’re planning to do with that money, specifically.” [Leave, West 
Midlands, female]
The second assumption made by Leave voters about economic impacts was that the UK would be 
able to strike trade deals that were more favourable outside the EU. There was a belief that the EU had 
restricted who the UK could trade with. As a result, there was an expectation that over the mid to long 
term, as trade deals were reached with other countries, the economic outlook would improve.
“It will get better, because we’re allowed to choose who we want to have trade deals with and 
where we can purchase everything from everyday items” [Leave, South West, female]
There was scepticism about some of the official predictions of negative impacts to trade, such as 
difficulties importing medicines, which were repeatedly described as “scaremongering”. There was also 
a view among Leave-voting participants in London and the South East that economic forecasting in 
general, and Treasury forecasting in particular, could not be trusted. 
Beyond a generalised sense of a negative impact on trade (at least in the short term), Leavers also 
anticipated differentiated changes for specific sectors of the economy. The agricultural sector was 
expected to be particularly affected as a result of two changes: 1) a change to the immigration system, 
meaning farmers would lose easy access to migrant labour; and 2) the loss of agricultural subsidies from 
the EU. The potential prospect of tariffs on agricultural exports was another issue raised by a participant 
in the North East whose daughter was a sheep farmer. 
The other key sector identified as likely to experience negative impacts was the health and social care 
sector. Again, the negative impact was expected to come from changes to the immigration system, 
which would make it harder to recruit staff. Nevertheless, there was a sense of hope among participants 
that this would lead to an increase in wages in the sector in order to attract a British workforce.
In some groups, Leavers identified other sectors that could be negatively affected after Brexit. For 
instance, there was a view among participants in Wales that the aeronautics industry – an important local 
industry - could be particularly affected. Participants in the South West expected their area, and other 
rural areas like theirs, would be somewhat shielded from the consequences, as they felt that the financial 
sector and manufacturing would be more affected as headquarters moved abroad. 
The one exception to the negative impacts described above was the fishing industry. Leave-voting 
participants in the West Midlands, Scotland, Wales and the South West anticipated that this sector would 
benefit from changes following Brexit, assuming that UK politicians took a tough line in their negotiations 
with the EU. It was felt to be significant that fishermen would no longer have to throw away catch due to 
quotas from the EU.
Remainers also picked out specific sectors that would be particularly negatively affected, which 
corresponded with those identified by Leave voters – health and social care, and agriculture. One 
Remain voter also raised the prospect of challenges facing the music industry, with touring being made 
harder. However, as noted earlier they expected these consequences to be longer term and did not 
identify any areas that would benefit from leaving the EU. 
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 SOCIETY
As above, across Leave and Remain groups there was an implicit expectation that changes to the 
immigration system and the end of free movement would lead to a reduction of people coming to the 
UK to work in specific sectors such as agriculture, and health and social care. However, when asking 
Leavers what changes they expected to see, few explicitly stated that they anticipated a major decrease 
in immigration to the UK. This was surprising, given the importance of this issue when asked what 
mattered about leaving the EU (see Chapter 2). 
Nevertheless, Leave-voting participants did anticipate that there would be changes to the immigration 
system, leading to more “control”, such as the examples identified in Chapter 3 on moving to points-
based immigration. This suggests that a desire for more control did not necessarily imply an expectation 
of lower numbers for Leavers. In the few cases where the level of immigration was explicitly commented 
on, participants expressed a view that they did not actually anticipate much change. One participant 
commented, for example:
“I’m not convinced that leaving is going to materially affect immigration from Europe or 
elsewhere.” [Leave, North East, male]
For most Leavers, the issue of immigration appears to be about re-establishing control over who comes 
in rather than a question about overall numbers of arrivals. 
Apart from immigration, there was also a view among participants in both Leave and Remain groups 
that there would be practical changes to travel for British citizens. Although this was seen as a direct 
consequence of Brexit, there was less specificity about how people expected things to change, aside 
from a general expectation that it would entail potentially longer queues at EU border check points or 
that they may not have access to the reciprocal health insurance schemes.
“I think we’re going to miss the freedom of being able to travel (…) just that very thought of 
not having the freedom to travel around Europe as easily as we did or have the European 
Health Card and things like that, that’s going to be a huge change for the future.” [Leave, West 
Midlands, female]
For Remainers, there was a feeling of regret about this change. However, once again, participants 
expected other groups to be more affected than them. Those identified as being more impacted included 
young British people who want to move to study or work in the EU, British citizens who want to move to 
Spain, and British citizens who want to work in multinationals, which - it was implied - had offices within 
the EU.
 IDENTITY
Leave-voting participants centred their discussions of changes to identity around changes to 
governance. There was a sense that the ability to make laws in the UK was closely linked to feelings of 
pride in their identity. This tallies with the priority given to governance arrangements for Leave-voting 
participants (see Chapter 3). There was a view that the UK had always had a different legal tradition 
than the rest of the EU and that in many ways the UK’s laws and regulations were ahead of the EU in 
upholding standards. 
“We tend to drag people up to our standard not the other way around, so I think there are 
endless opportunities that are available there” [Leave, London and the South East, male]
As a result, having greater controls of laws and regulations, and being independent and sovereign 
would re-invigorate a sense of pride in identity - whether British, Welsh, English or Scottish or multiple 
identities. 
“I think that’s an important point that you just raised in that giving us back our identity as Welsh 
citizens rather than European, and living by their laws, well, let us make our own laws.” [Leave, 
Wales, female]
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In this view, far from diminishing the UK’s place in the world and the way other countries saw the UK, 
changes after Brexit would enhance the UK’s global identity.
“I think we will be a force to be reckoned with again on the world stage, in a lot of things.” 
[Leave, North East, male]
In contrast, Remainers discussed changes to feelings of identity in more detail than Leavers, and more 
commonly framed these in relation to societal changes. In this group, participants thought some of these 
changes had already happened, including an increase in intolerance, a rise in nationalism and a view that 
the UK was turning inwards and becoming parochial. 
“We’re going to get more of a realistic sense of what we are, which is an offshore island to 
Europe that’s got an interesting long-term history. (…) Actually we are not all that important 
except in our own eyes, and I think we’re going to learn that.” [Remain, North East, male]
“We’re a small island and we’re actually quite inward looking and parochial” [Remain, West 
Midlands, female]
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Drivers of the need for change
Underlying the changes and priorities that people identify as linked to Brexit are a number of issues and 
concerns of wider social and historical resonance. 
The concerns Leave voters raised about social transformations or political accountability were in 
many cases those projected onto the context of Brexit, even when they may not be directly related to 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. In part, this apparent conflation of Brexit with wider issues may be 
further explained by many people viewing the process of Brexit, combined with the impact of Covid-19 
(discussed below), as symbolising a moment of national change. However, as this quote demonstrates, it 
was not always the case that participants felt clear about how any of these changes would be achieved:
“So, whilst Brexit might not automatically look at those kind of issues, at least there’s something 
where, change triggers change. I just think that, I don’t know how Brexit’s going to turn out. I 
don’t know whether it’ll be the biggest mistake we’ve ever made, but I feel like we need to do 
something, because it could be the best thing we’ve ever done.” [Leave, West Midlands, female]
Our analysis identified four main factors as driving Leavers’ perceptions of a need for change. 
Firstly, on an economic front, there was a clear sense that Leave-voting participants wanted to see a 
reverse in de-industrialisation and the decline of manufacturing in some parts of the country. This was 
particularly the case in groups in the North East, Scotland and Wales who all talked extensively about 
manufacturing and industry, although this sentiment was also echoed in other groups. There was a 
desire for a return of manufacturing to the UK, which they hoped would be facilitated by Brexit. There 
was a view that the UK’s ability to invest in industries had been constrained by the EU, although specific 
examples were not given. However, some participants acknowledged that leaving the EU may not 
generate the changes they were hoping for. 
“We took the hit [in this area] when we closed down all the steelworks, the mines, etc., and that 
was when everything changed here. I don’t know that leaving Europe, in this area, will change 
very much at all.” [Leave, Scotland, female]
Secondly, policies of austerity and a lack of funding for key public services, including the NHS, appeared 
to be another key factor. Leave groups talked of pressures on public services, such as schools, local 
councils and the NHS - evidenced in their inability to get a GP appointment. As these pressures were felt 
to be driven primarily by an increase in the number of immigrants, there was a sense that public services 
would improve after Brexit. These discussions were somewhat nuanced, with one view expressed 
in Yorkshire that for the longer-term funding of the NHS the public needed to have a “grown up” 
conversation that acknowledged it could not all be funded through general taxation. However, a general 
desire for better public services came through strongly.
A further societal factor driving a need for change among Leave voters was a view that the UK’s welfare 
system, and modern society more widely, had become “soft”. Negative views about younger people, 
and their perceived lack of work ethic, were underpinned by a view that it was too easy for people – 
both British citizens and immigrants – to claim welfare rather than working. A view summarised by one 
participant
“That’s the problem with our society (…) the benefit system. The English are feral, and they were 
fed for years and years off, if you stubbed your toe you got Disability Living Allowance for the 
rest of your life, and you don’t go to work” [Leave, West Midlands, female]
Once again, it was expected that a decrease in immigration as a result of Brexit would lead to greater 
pressure on British people to accept less appealing jobs.
On issues of governance, as identified in Chapter 3, implicit in many discussions was the sense for both 
Leave and Remain was that there was a lack of accountability or representation in the UK’s political 
systems. There was agreement across both groups one on clear change they anticipated after Brexit: 
politicians no longer being able to “hide” behind the EU for their decisions.
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Change in the context of Covid-19
The Covid-19 pandemic has changed the context for the end of the transition period and was frequently 
mentioned by both Remain- and Leave-voting participants. There was a view that the pandemic had 
overtaken Brexit in both the media and the public’s attention and was seen by participants as a major 
disruptive moment likely to lead to more substantial changes than Brexit alone. There was a view 
that Covid-19 had exacerbated or revealed a number of underlying societal issues, which could act 
as a catalyst for positive change. However, the situation was also felt to add to the general sense of 
uncertainty about what to expect for the future. 
The biggest impact that Covid-19 was expected to have was in terms of making the economic outlook 
substantially worse. What this involved in detail was often not specified by participants, but where it 
was it was described in terms of large increases in government borrowing and a rise in unemployment. 
Leave-voting participants felt that this would affect Brexit in two main ways. One view was that the effect 
of Brexit (including any negative effects) would be subsumed by the negative economic effects of the 
pandemic
“Covid-19 is going to just completely wipe that Brexit effect off the map” [Leave, South West, 
male]
There was a degree of matter-of-factness to this view – the scale of the challenges after Covid-19 
seeming to dwarf any Brexit-related challenges. Some participants however saw an advantage to this, as 
it would mean dealing with both issues at once.
“I’m absolutely sure that the two problems, Covid-19 and Brexit, will overlay to a point where 
you won’t ever be able to differentiate which was which, but I think it’s great to get them out of 
the way at the same time.” [Leave, London and the South East, male]
The second view among Leavers on the impact of the worsening economic situation was that it would 
put at risk the changes that they had hoped for as a result Brexit. 
“I really want exiting Europe to be a good a thing, but I haven’t seen any figures that have 
convinced me that it’s going to be a good thing, particularly for the North East. I hope it is, I 
really hope it is, but I also have this fear now (…) that the country has, we’ve created so much 
debt to deal with corona [sic], that that may become the excuse for not investing in all these 
things that we were promised we would see investment in” [Leave, North East, female]
This was echoed by participants in London and the South East, who worried that the negative economic 
context created by Covid-19 would make it harder for the UK to take up the opportunities of Brexit. As a 
result, one participant explicitly commented that they may have voted differently in light of the pandemic. 
However, the opposite view was also to be found. Among the Yorkshire Leave group was the view that 
given the government had spent a lot of money on the pandemic response, it may mean they would 
”loosen the purse strings” for investment in the regions. 
Beyond economic impacts, this situation was thought to have brought to the fore some underlying issues 
within society, and Leavers were hopeful that these could lead to more positive long-term changes. 
Covid-19 had highlighted the importance of the NHS and social care, and the need for sustainable 
funding. There was also a view that the experience of the pandemic had led to a re-appraisal and a 
revaluation of what some participants called “menial” jobs – including social care workers and cleaners. 
The reliance on jobs that had previously been disregarded was seen as an opportunity to promote the 
value and dignity of that kind of work (some of which it was acknowledged had previously be done by 
immigrant workers). There was a hope that this could lead to a re-appraisal of the sort of jobs to value. 
“Making something that’s, doesn’t seem as an appealing job, maybe isn’t appealing, you may 
find after this Covid-19 thing now that all these domestics that work in hospitals, people look at 
them going, ‘Hey, that’s not too bad.’ That’s become a first, frontline job that now. It’s brought a 
lot of - truck drivers, delivery drivers - it’s brought a lot of people that were in the background to 
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the forefront in people’s minds.” [Leave, North East, male]
There was another view among Leavers that the pandemic had demonstrated the importance of the UK 
having its own manufacturing base. The example given was the lack of personal protective equipment 
(PPE) and that the UK was not able to manufacture sufficient amounts and be self-reliant. More widely, 
participants commented on changes in the way people were living their lives and the longer lasting effect 
this could bring about. These included shifts to working from home, which it was felt could have long-
term effects on housing and residential distribution around the country, and changes to travel, which 
were expected to have wider environmental impacts. As a result, for some Leave voters, the disruption 
created by the pandemic presented an opportunity to push for positive change on this front.
“I think in a way, it could be seen as fortunate that they’re happening simultaneously, because it 
gives us a chance to look at the world after Covid-19 and after Brexit, then. Perhaps at least it’s 
an opportunity to try and think what kind of country we want.” [Leave, Yorkshire, male] 
For both Leave and Remain groups, the restrictions that had come alongside Covid-19 had also raised 
questions about the relationship between the different nations of the UK. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these 
issues were raised particularly in the groups in Scotland and Wales. For these groups, there were mixed 
views on whether having the devolved governments responsible for Covid-19 restrictions was positive 
or negative. One view among Leave voters was that it would have been more sensible to have the same 
rules across the UK. In contrast, other participants felt that the devolved administrations were more 
clearly focused on what was best for the specific country. However, the differences in regulations had 
also highlighted the powers of the devolved administrations to participants in England.
“The patchwork nature of Covid-19 restrictions across the UK, for instance, have almost built on 
that previous uncertainty as to how we, as a United Kingdom, are going to move into this new 
relationship with Northern Ireland, with Scotland, Wales, etc.” [Remain, London and the South 
East, male]
Among participants in England, there were different views expressed as to whether this was positive or 
negative which were not closely tied to whether people had voted to Leave or Remain. However, across 
the board there was a recognition that having these differences exposed may lead to calls for further 
devolution in the future. 
Remainers also shared many of the views of Leave groups in relation to the impact of Covid-19. In 
particular the way it had shone a spotlight on the importance of the NHS and social care. However, the 
discussion amongst Remainers of the combined economic impact of Covid-19 and Brexit included a 
view that the impact of the pandemic would enable politicians to “hide” the impact of Brexit. As one 
participant put it:
“I think Covid-19 will cover up the sins of Brexit” [Remain, Scotland, male]
 CONCLUSION
Looking to the future and discussing changes after Brexit was riven with uncertainty for participants in 
both Leave and Remain groups. 
Whilst there was broad agreement on all sides about anticipated short-term negative economic changes, 
Leavers tended to be more optimistic that in the mid to long term Brexit would drive positive economic 
developments. Returning decision-making powers to the UK and having more control over immigration 
flows were also seen by Leave voters as positive changes to come.
Changes after Brexit were discussed by all participants with repeated reference to Covid-19. Both 
events were seen as precipitating major changes in society, although for many the negative economic 
impact of the pandemic was thought to outweigh any Brexit effects. The pandemic had also highlighted 
a number of underlying social issues, many of which linked back to wider societal concerns participants 
hoped to see tackled after Brexit. Thus, for some Leavers, the concurrence of the two events opened up 
opportunities for more substantial changes.
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Conclusion 
The aim of these eight deliberative workshops was to explore the views and priorities of higher-income 
Leave voters for Britain after Brexit. We sought to gather detailed insight into what mattered to them 
about Britain leaving the EU, as well as their hopes and the changes they anticipated in future. 
People’s views tended to overlap across these areas but were distinct in terms of the scale at which their 
discussions were had; from the more abstract and generalised (to the UK as a whole) when discussing 
what mattered, to points more rooted in lived experience and their local places when thinking about the 
future.
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 WHAT MATTERS TO COMFORTABLE LEAVERS?
This study clearly demonstrates that for these Leave voters issues of immigration and governance 
were of greatest significance, and these themes occupied much of this discussion. The idea of taking 
back control resonated strongly and this was underpinned by a sense that EU membership constrained 
independent decision making for the UK and risked muddying a clear sense of British identity. Economic 
concerns were secondary (with the exception of Scotland) at this point. This was not to suggest these 
did not matter, but these issues tended not to be considered the most important in making the decision 
to leave the EU.
Many discussions took place at a relatively abstract level, drawing on headline information in general 
terms. Much of people’s deliberations related to the UK as a whole rather than a delineation of what 
was important by place or region. Participants were also not particularly reflective about their views 
suggesting the strength of their opinions on Brexit have remained unchanged over time.
When asked to concentrate on what was most important, their priorities were in the main an extension 
of concerns on governance and immigration, with sovereignty and a clearer sense of national identity 
(arising from greater control over the perceived impacts of immigration) rising to the top. However, after 
some discussion, people tended to be more considered about why these things were a priority. The 
rhetoric on immigration was toned down and Leavers spent more time imagining what things like free 
movement meant for a range of people, including themselves, e.g. in terms of travel and visas. There 
was also acknowledgement on the value of – albeit certain types of - immigration or immigrant with 
respect to the labour market.
These discussions clearly signalled a desire to rebuild Britain based on a clear sense of identity and 
investment in certain types of industry. Both Leavers and Remainers saw the EU referendum as having 
heightened Britain’s social divides and felt it important that the country has a clear sense of identity 
to unite itself over post-Brexit. However, there were clear differences in what Leavers and Remainers 
wanted Britain to take pride in. 
Leavers tended to see sovereignty as a means to be independent, with a re-establishment of national 
pride, which, if got right, could improve our standing and ability to run the UK as we wished. In doing so, 
a more nostalgic view was referenced by many Leavers that we could or should – through leaving the 
EU - return to a time more characterised by the British empire, where Britain was ‘in charge’. In contrast 
to Remainers more concerned with being ‘open’ to the world, this perhaps underscores how strongly 
Leavers feel about this as the route to reclaiming or re-establishing of Britain and the opportunities they 
think this affords.
 WHAT DO COMFORTABLE LEAVERS WANT FROM BREXIT?
What was clear from discussions was that Comfortable Leavers felt left out on issues of governance and 
identity. Their discussions indicated they were hoping for a clearer sense of national identity as the UK 
left the EU, based on a more nostalgic vision of British values and priorities.
In many ways, the more affluent Leave vote can also be understood as a protest vote in socio-cultural 
terms, rather than economically, and this discontent has driven a wish to take the opportunity of Brexit 
to force a moment of national change. This is not necessarily a wholesale rejection of the status quo, 
but that having greater control of laws and regulations, being independent and sovereign, would re-
invigorate a sense of national pride - whether British, Welsh, English or Scottish or multiple identities. 
This extended to taking back control, not just for Britain, but also at local and devolved levels in terms of 
political accountability and deciding economic priorities.
There is also some sense that Leave voters wanted reassurance from the Brexit result that their view 
of what life should be like can be prioritised and created. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, many 
aspects of this in terms of social transformations or political accountability were projected onto the 
context of Brexit, even when they were not be directly related to EU exit. 
More concretely, participants also wanted to see investment in the places they lived, particularly in those 
areas with an industrial past and, again, thought Brexit would help re-align Britain’s economic priorities 
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to do this. 
The changes people actually expected to see were more tempered and reflective than the distinct views 
held in earlier discussions on what mattered to them. This was in part because there were few specifics 
available at the time of fieldwork on the future policy direction and Covid-19 had created additional 
uncertainty. People were also less confident in naming specific changes that might otherwise be logical 
end points for some of their earlier expressed priorities. For example, the outcome of wanting less 
immigration was not expressed as a desire to see less multicultural communities. 
With a lack of clarity on what Brexit might actually deliver, participants instead discussed the broader list 
of grievances they had on the ‘state of the nation’, as explored in Chapter 3. This also gave rise to some 
discussion that indicated scepticism and a lack of trust among Leavers that the UK government would 
deliver a deal in line with the things that mattered to them. 
On both sides of the vote, participants generally concurred that a close, mutually beneficial agreement 
on exiting the EU would be preferable. They hoped for Britain to promptly move beyond the antagonism 
that has characterised negotiations to date and strike an agreement without a further extension to the 
deadline. 
Leavers and Remainers also both identified the likelihood that there would be short-term negative 
economic consequences to Brexit, but Leavers were much more confident that this would quickly 
improve and the impact (on them at least) would not be too great. These discussions brought attention 
to the fact that even where less favourable consequences of Brexit were identified, these did not 
particularly affect the views or priorities of Leave voters. 
Comfortable leavers therefore remained optimistic that over the mid to long term Brexit would spur 















Leave 7 11 6 14 11 7 14 11 81
Remain 7 5 6 7 8 7 7 8 55
Didn’t vote 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
AGE
18-24 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 6
25-44 4 5 2 11 3 5 5 3 38
45-64 4 7 7 6 10 3 11 12 60
65+ 6 3 2 4 5 6 5 3 34
SEX
Female 7 8 4 10 11 8 13 9 70
Male 7 8 10 11 8 6 8 10 68
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Employed 6 12 11 11 7 7 15 10 79
Self-employed 1 0 0 4 3 0 2 0 10
Retired 6 3 2 5 7 4 4 7 38
Unemployed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Not working currently 
(studying, caring, 
illness or disability)
1 1 1 1 2 3 0 1 10
HIGHEST LEVEL OF QUALIFICATION*
A level and above 10 14 10 17 12 13 13 15 104
Lower than A levels 4 2 2 3 3 1 5 2 22
Missing 0 0 2 1 4 0 3 2 12
TENURE*
Owner occupier 13 12 10 14 14 13 14 14 104
Private rental 1 3 2 4 1 1 2 3 17
Social rental 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 4
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Missing 0 0 2 1 4 0 3 0 10
Appendix A. Sample Composition 
Table 1: Sample composition across workshops
* Some data for tenure and educational qualification was missing from the sample file. This is likely due to the change in
recruitment mode.
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Appendix B. Methodology 
 WORKSHOP DESIGN
Traditional deliberative approaches include a learning or briefing component to enable all participants to 
have a shared level of understanding before proceeding to discussion. In this case, the length and aim of 
the workshops meant that we did not include a formal learning component or access to expert input but 
drew on deliberative techniques to support discussions.
The workshop format allowed us to talk across common issues with participants (i.e. definitions and 
understanding of economic contexts) before giving people the opportunity to talk in more detail about 
their views and attitudes. The choice to separate participants by EU Referendum vote was taken to give 
people the opportunity to speak freely about their views rather than risk being dragged into the debates 
about the merits of either side of the debate. We also wanted to be able to clearly attribute views to 
different types of participant and isolate Leave views in particular. 
The group sessions kicked off with participants having a discussion in their small group on the 
characteristics of their area. This served both as an ice breaker and also provided some insight into what 
they thought was distinct about their region, and the importance of place to the participants. 
In order to support discussions, we provided a short presentation back in a plenary session that 
summarised the key content we were asking participants to discuss (see Figure 1 below).
Figure 1: Workshop material presented to participants.
SOCIETY 
Issues relating to who lives and how we live 
together. Some examples - 
•  EU citizens may be asked to comply with 
stricter requirements to come and live in the UK, 
which could make a difference to the make-up 
of who lives and works here.
•  The UK might offer more favourite immigration 
rules to Commonwealth countries for example.
ECONOMY & SERVICES 
Issues relating to how we produce and trade 
goods, jobs and the labour market.  
Some examples - 
•  Some of the possible options might mean 
changes to types of industry or employment 
available in a certain area.
•  There has been much debate about trade deals, 
e.g. how trading with the USA could lead to 
accepting lower standards on animal welfare.
IDENTITY 
Issues relating to the values, ideas or beliefs that 
shape us. Some examples - 
•  Some people feel very strongly ‘European’, 
whilst others think leaving the EU might provide 
an opportunity to develop stronger regional 
identities.
•  The UK would have to decide whether to 
participate in programmes, such as European 
City of Culture in which towns and cities 
represent what they think makes them unique.
GOVERNANCE 
Issues relating to who makes decisions on 
the things that shape our lives and how those 
decisions get made. Some examples - 
•  Whilst we will no longer be subject to EU laws, 
it isn’t clear if local authorities or regional 
authorities will be given more decision-making 
powers.
•  Leaving the EU might make it clearer who is 
responsible for changes affecting out lives.
•  Some global challenges, such as climate 
change, may be best tackled at the international 
level. The UK would have to decide who to  
co-operate with on these kinds of issues
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We also included an acknowledgement that the live context of Covid-19 may influence how people were 
thinking about these issues.
Participants were then again split into two groups (according to EU Referendum vote) for moderated 
discussions on three key questions. 
•  What matters to participants about the UK leaving the EU?
•  What changes do participants anticipate to their communities [and the UK as a whole] as the UK 
leaves the EU?
•  What priorities or hopes do people have for the future with these anticipated changes? 
Facilitators had associated prompts where necessary. The workshop closed with a plenary session 
that summarised participant discussions across groups and to check that researchers captured salient 
points. 
 COVID-19 ADAPTATIONS
As indicated above, our original study plans were affected by the introduction of social distancing 
guidelines in late March 2020. At that point, our approach was finalised, and we had begun arranging the 
recruitment (via a recruitment agency) and logistics for several of our workshops.
In consultation with UKICE, we decided to adapt our approach to carry out the workshops online using 
Zoom. We selected Zoom as it provides several functions to ensure security, stable audio/visual quality 
and it allows participants to move between plenary and small group discussions using ‘breakout rooms’. 
The software also enables facilitators to adjust a number of settings – e.g. on screen sharing and 
recording which maximises participant safety and appropriate use. Although this did not have significant 
implications for the workshop design, it did affect the recruitment of participants and introduced 
considerations for facilitators about the practicalities of delivering in a different mode.
Recruitment 
Prior to this adaptation, we were planning to work with a recruitment agency in order to target the very 
local geographies in which we wanted to hold workshops. Typically, recruitment agency methods tend 
to be a mixture of database contacts and on-street recruitment; the latter of which was now no longer 
feasible.
We instead changed approach and used the NatCen panel to derive a sample from which to begin our 
recruitment. The panel is a probability-based online and telephone panel that runs an omnibus survey 
six times a year. This gave us the advantage of a readily available sample who we already had lots of 
information about and had many of the characteristics we were interested in. A further advantage was 
that most respondents to NatCen panel surveys complete them online, and so we could also be more 
confident that a proportion would have the available technology to attend workshops. 
However, one significant trade off was that we had to widen the geography of the localities we were 
originally interested in to ensure that we could recruit a sufficient number of people to the workshops. 
This meant expanding localities of interest to a regional level in England. The regions were based on the 
NUTS 2 regions for the UK, although London and the South East were combined as discussed further 
in the workshop overview. This did however give us the advantage in Scotland and Wales of drawing 
participants from across the country to a single workshop without logistical restrictions. 
Once areas were selected, we sent an invitation email to our sample outlining the research and how they 
could get involved. In order to confirm that they met our inclusion criteria on income and availability for 
the planned workshop dates, interested participants were asked to complete a short survey. It was from 
this group that we then sent workshop invitations, and these were followed up with telephone calls to 
complete our quotas and confirm attendance.
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Going online
The team at NatCen were familiar with using Zoom for deliberative research and already had a number 
of available resources to support participants with getting online and understanding what the workshop 
might be like. Facilitators had experience moderating deliberative discussions virtually and were able to 
provide technical support on the day. 
Despite this, the change in mode did affect participation in two ways. First, there were a small number 
of people (12) in our sample who were interested in the research but told us they did not have the 
technology or confidence to join an online session, which meant in some cases spending more time 
on recruitment to ensure we completed our quotas for attendees. Second, there was attrition between 
recruitment and attendance. Although we were expecting a higher rate of attrition than is usual for 
face-to-face events, in the first two workshops (North East & Wales) ‘on the day’ attendance was low, 
particularly for Leave voters.
Supplementary interviews and augmenting the recruitment approach
As we had an under-representation of Leavers– our key group of interest – in these early workshops, we 
took two mitigating actions. The first was to re-contact those who did not attend workshops to invite 
them to a 45-minute telephone interview (covering equivalent content to the workshops). This resulted in 
eight interviews with participants in the North East and Wales.
The second was to augment our approach for the remaining workshops to boost the number of 
people we had recruited by working with the databases of a recruitment agency in the West Midlands 
and Scotland. This proved successful in ensuring a good turnout and resulted in a higher number of 
participants than originally planned in workshops.
Details of the number of participants and composition by vote are included in the workshop overviews 
given in Chapter two.
 ANALYSIS 
Facilitators took notes of small group discussions, which were also audio recorded and transcribed. To 
support the write up of the final report, we developed a thematic coding framework that reflected our key 
research questions and accounted for the discussions had by participants, for example on their priorities 
and concerns. Coded data were grouped into themes from which analysis plans and the reporting 
structure develop.
